1. Introduction. In 1944 von Neumann and Morgenstern [3] introduced a theory of solutions (stable sets) for «-person games in characteristic function form. It has been shown that solutions do exist for several large classes of games, and it had been conjectured that every game has at least one solution. However, the author [2] recently described a ten-person game which has no solution. This paper gives a detailed proof that there is no solution for this game. The essential definitions for an «-person game will be reviewed before the counterexample and the proof are given.
2.
Definitions. An n-person game is a pair (N, v) where N={1, 2,..., «} is a set of « players labeled 1,2,...,« and where v is a real valued characteristic function on 2N, i.e., v assigns a real number v(S) to each nonempty subset S of N and i(0) = O for the empty set 0. Intuitively, the number v(S) represents the value (wealth, power) of the coalition S. The set of imputations is A « Ix: y xk = v(N) and xh =■ v({h}) for all heNÍ I heN J where x=(xx, x2,..., xn) is a vector with real components. Each imputation x represents a realizable distribution of the wealth among the players; player h receives the amount xh.
The players in a coalition 5 will prefer imputation x to y if each of them receives more in x and if they can effect x. If x and y e A and S is a nonempty subset of N, then y dominates x via S, denoted y domsx, means (1) yh > xh for all « e S and (2) 2 Ä * v(S). One can show that the core of this game is the convex hull of the six imputations ch (« = 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10). For the proofs in this paper it is sufficient to prove that C contains this convex hull. This can be done by simply checking that each of these ch satisfies all of the inequalities x(S)^v(S) in the definition of C. It is also easy to check that any xe B which satisfies ;r(13579) = 4 = /'({l, 3, 5, 7, 9}) will be in C, and thus C = {xeB: x(13579) = 4}. 4 . Partition of A. To prove that this game has no solution, it is necessary to define several regions in A. It will be assumed in these definitions and throughout the remainder of this paper (unless otherwise specified) that the variable indices i,j, k,p, q, and r take on the values (i,j,r,k) = (1,3, 4, 5), (3, 5, 6, 1), and (5,1,2,3) and (p,q) = (7,9) and (9,7).
For example, an expression containing the subscript i stands for the three expressions where z'=l, 3, and 5; an expression containing the indices, /,/ and k represents the three expressions where the ordered triple (/,/ k) = (l, 3, 5), (3, 5, 1), and (5, 1, 3); and an expression containing p represents the two expressions where p = l and 9. The letter « will continue as a free index which is defined whenever it is used.
Using these conventions on the variable indices, define the following twelve subsets of B: where (p,q) = (l, 9) or (9, 7) in the relations (8), (9), and (9'). It follows that if x e B-(C uFuf) then xe B and either (i) x(13579)<4andx;i<l for h=l, 3, 5, 7, and 9,
(ii) x(13579)<4, x¡= 1, and xh< 1 for «=/ A, 7, and 9, or (iii) x(13579)<4, xt¿ 1, x"=l, xft< 1 for «=/ A:, and q, and either x(jkq)<2 or x(imq)<2 for «1=7 or A:
where (/,/ *)-(l, 3, 5), (3, 5, 1), or (5, 1, 3), and (p,q) = (7, 9) or (9, 7).
Each of these three cases will now be considered. In case (i), one can pick y e B such that y(13579) = 4 and l^ylt>xh for «=1,3,5,7, and 9. Observe that y(2, 4, 6, 8, 10) = 5-j(l, 3, 5, 7, 9) = 1; [March y({2, 4, 6, 8, 10}-{//})=l-.y,, = >>"_! for h = 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10; and thus j>.« £,>*<!* where h = 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10. Therefore, y is in the convex hull of c2, c4, c6, c8, and c10, and >» dom(24 6 g 10) x. In summary, the convex hull of the ch (« = 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10) is contained in C and its dominion contains all xe B which satisfy (i).
In case (ii), x(jk!9)<3, since x¡ = 1 and x(13579)<4. In this case one can pick yeB such that y(jk!9) = 3, y¡=l, and liyh>xh for h=j, k, 7, and 9. Observe that y(j+ 1, *+ 1, 8, 10) = 5-X¿, '+ 1)-XAk, 7,9)= 1 ; XÍ/+ lr*+ 1, 8,10}-{«}) = 1-^=^-1 for h=j+l, k + l, 8, and 10; and thus y = 2n jv" where h=j+l, k+l, 8, and 10. Therefore, y is in the convex hull of ci+1, ck+1, c8, and c10, and y domüilCi7i9) x. In summary, the convex hull of the ch (h=j+l, k+ 1, 8, and 10) is contained in C and its dominion contains all x e B which satisfies (ii). Consider case (iii) and first assume that x(jkq) < 2. One can pick yeB such that y(jkq) = 2, y, = 1, yp = 1, and 1 i yh > xh for « =j, k, and 9. Observe that y(j+l,k+l,q+l) = 5-y(i,i+l)-y(j,k,q)-y(p,p+l) = 1; y({j+l,k+l,q+l}-{h})=l-yh=yh.x for «=7+1, k+l, and g+1; and thus y = 2h¿v" when h=j+l, k+l, and g+1. Therefore, .y is in the convex hull of ci+1, ck + 1, and cQ + 1, and y dom{;iJCiiJ) x. In summary, the convex hull of c" (h=j+l, k+l, and q+1) is contained in C and its dominion contains all x e B which satisfy (iii) and x(jkq)<2.
Consider case (iii) and now assume that x(imq) < 2 for m -j or k. If x¡ < 1 then the proof for this case is the same as in the preceding paragraph only /, m, and q now take the place of j, k, and q. If x¡ = 1 and m-j [or m = k] then xk< l=x¿ [or x¿ < 1 =x,], and thus x(jkq)<x(imq)<2; and this case becomes the same case as in the preceding paragraph, This completes the proof that Dom C^>B -(C u F u F), and thus condition (I) has been verified.
6. Domination into the region E. The next step is to prove condition (II), i.e., F n Dom (Cu F) = 0. This will now be done by considering several cases. In the following cases return to the convention that any expression involving some of the indices i,j, r, and k will continue to represent the three expressions where (i,j, r, k) = (1,3, 4, 5), (3, 5, 6, l),and(5, 1,2,3). If y e Fp (recall that the pair (p, q) = (7, 9) and (9, 7)), then yv= 1 and y(ihq)^2 for h=j and k; and thus y(iq)^y(ihq) -1 = 1, and so » = 0 or y(ir!9)=y(irpq)>2. The conditions (10) through (14) are sufficient to prove (II). Although it will not be done in this paper, one could prove in addition that F n Dom (Cu Fu F) = 0. This would imply that C u F is contained in any solution K for this game.
7. Domination within the region F. In order to prove condition (III), i.e., that there exists no solution Ä" for E, one must consider possible domination between imputations in E. However, (10), (11), and (12) imply that only domination via coalitions of the type {i, r, 7, 9} need be considered. Furthermore, F¡ n Dom(i,r,7,9) (F u Ek) = 0, because if y e E¡ u Ek then y,-l, and thus y;+i=.yr = 0. Therefore, the only possible domination within F is illustrated by the diagram:
{3,6,7,9} {1,4,7,9} {5,2,7,9}
Next, one can consider what a typical element in F will dominate and what will dominate it. First, define the three regions G,iy) = {x e E, : x7 > y7, x9 > y9, and x(z>79) S 2} where y can be any element in F. (See Figure 2 .) It is clear that the G,(y) are nonempty. If v e E, and y(ir!9) > 2, then F n Dom y = 0 ; and if y e E, and y(ir!9)S2, then E n Dom y = {x e E¡ : x7 < y7 and x9 < y9}, [March since y¡ = 1 >x¡ and _yr=_y;+1>0 = xi+1 = xr. Similarly, one sees that if/eF¡ then F n Dom-1 y = {x e E¡ : x7 > y7, x9 > y9, and x(ir!9) S2} = G,(y).
One can also show that for any y e F, Dom G¿(.y) => Ck(^) and (15) fnDom-1Gfc()) = G¡W.
Finally, one can assume that there exists a solution F' for F and arrive at a contradiction. Clearly K'^ 0. Pick an arbitrary z e F' and assume that zeE¡ where./= 1, 3, or 5. For the remainder of this section (i,j, k) will always refer to one particular triple (1,3,5), (3,5, 1), or (5, 1,3) . Condition (3') implies that K' n Dom-1 z= 0, and thus
Thus (4'), (15), and (16) imply that
One can therefore pick a z e K' n F¡ with z'1>z1 and z'9>z9. Repeating the argument up to (17) for z', one obtains (18) K' nGk(z') ¿ 0.
Since Gk(z') c Gk(z), conditions (16) and (18) give the desired contradiction. Therefore, (III) is verified, and this completes the proof that this game has no solution. where this maximum is taken over all partitions {5!, S2,..., Sm} of S. The resulting v' is superadditive. One can also check that for this particular game, v'(S) = v(S) for all S<= N which have i'(5)>0. In particular v'(N) = v(N) and thus the set A remains the same. One can also show (see Gillies) that if y dorn x in the game (N, t>'), then y dorn x in the game (N, v). Thus the game (N, v') has the same core and solutions as (A', r). Therefore, the game (N, v') has a superadditive v' and it has no solution.
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